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From YUCK to WOW and Back Again

are a form of enhancement, as are polio vaccine and many
other medical blessings that no one ﬁnds controversial. The
type of enhancements the authors are grappling with are, for
example, genetically engineered memory far beyond the
average, or speciﬁc athletic or artistic abilities that are normally the birthright of only a lucky few. One of the contested
issues is whether genetic enhancement, such as of one’s
eyesight, is ethically different from using spectacles or
surgery to achieve the same end. Put more broadly, we are
“taking evolution into our own hands” (Green, 2) and is that
something to be applauded or deplored?
Of course, conﬂicting liberal and conservative perspectives on issues in bioethics are hardly new. What is startling
here is the quality of inchoate dread versus sunny hopefulness, the way in which optimism or pessimism plays almost
a greater role than logical argument or ethical theory. The
reason, I think, is that, unless one wants to make a distinctly
theological argument about “playing God” and usurping
divine powers (even assuming that one could make that
argument ﬂy), one’s attitude to genetic engineering is
grounded largely on how one projects one’s hopes and fears
onto a future we can only begin to imagine. Green makes a
virtue of this futuristic uncertainty by relying heavily on
science ﬁction to make his points.
Michael Sandel’s slender book, not signiﬁcantly
enhanced from his 2004 article of the same name, relies
heavily on notions of “giftedness” and “givenness” to argue
against genetic manipulation (Sandel 2004). He fears, for
example, that parental “hubris” in attempting to select the
traits of their future children vitiates the ideal of the child as
“gift,” and imperils the unconditional love and acceptance
that is the hallmark of parenting, thus “disﬁguring” the
parent–child relationship. Harris derides Sandel for making
“Humpty-Dumpty” arguments in which words mean whatever he wishes them to, but I think Harris misses the core of
Sandel’s problem. If something—whether it is a child or the
natural world—is a gift, then there must be a Giver. And for
the “given” world to have moral weight when balanced
against the possibility that it could be radically changed for
the better, we must have some notion of a God-given universe. But Sandel knows that he cannot win his audience by
outright appeals to religion, so he is stuck with the very
difﬁcult task of trying to woo us with eloquent rhetoric and
appeals to “unease,” an unease we probably all share when
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To the familiar bioethics dichotomies of secular/religious
and deontological/utilitarian, add a new one: optimist/
pessimist. As Louis Menand wrote in 2004, “There is a great
battle going on in our culture today. It is a battle between
people who believe that science opens new possibilities for
human life and people who worry that it closes them”
(Menand 2004, 7). The recent spate of books about the possibilities of genetic enhancements, whether for individuals
or for mankind in general, highlights temperament over
theory. Each author cares deeply about both individual ﬂourishing and social justice, and yet they have sharply conﬂicting views on whether we should constrain or embrace the
new genetic possibilities. Or, to quote John Harris, how do
we get “From ‘Yuck!’ to ‘Wow!’ ”? (4)
The topic of all three books is genetic engineering and
“genetic enhancement.” The latter term is itself the subject
of many articles, but for our purposes we can say something
like: enhancement changes its subject for the better, in ways
that go beyond simply curing a deﬁcit, but that brings the
person beyond normal species functioning. The astute
reader will already have noted that bifocals for the elderly
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against a distinction between cure and enhancement, noting
that there is a continuum between, for example, giving
someone medicine to cure a disease, vaccinating someone
against that disease, or genetically engineering people to
resist HIV/AIDS.
Although each author addresses the need for caution in
the face of our terrible history of eugenics, neither Green nor
Harris makes a convincing argument as to why we need not
fear a return of coercive eugenics. Harris, in fact, is downright disingenuous. He seems to see the government’s role
as exhausted by its support of “parental and individual
choice” (9). And yet his hypothetical examples almost beg
for government intervention. In Chapter 3 Harris asks us to
imagine a world in which the ozone layer is so depleted that
humans became very vulnerable to melanoma, but that
green skin offered complete protection and scientists discovered a safe intervention that would turn skin permanently
green. Harris declares that he would choose that for himself,
and also for his newborn children. “Others might prefer their
children normal and cancerous. I would not impose on them,
but I hope that they would permit me to save my own life and
that of my kids. My kids would have a hard time until all
their friends were dead, but I imagine there would be enough
caring greens like me to provide them with more durable
companions—and they would have the last laugh” (38).
Harris declares himself “happy” for Sandel to welcome all
gifts and problems that come his way, as long as Sandel
allows Harris to choose enhancements for himself and his
children as Harris thinks best. Harris does not wish “to
control the lives of others” (122).
The problem is that, just as Harris argues that such a
beneﬁcent use of genetic enhancement is not only morally
acceptable but morally required, so it becomes obvious that
the state will have a very good reason for requiring all people
to turn green, or at least for requiring that all children be
green-iﬁed, if the alternative is likely death. A state that can
put ﬂuoride into the public water supply, or require vaccination during a measles outbreak, or insist on a blood transfusion for the child of Jehovah’s Witnesses, can certainly
insist on turning children green! One can make analogous
arguments for genetic enhancements related to intelligence
and learning ability. A state that can require mandatory
school attendance, or that can suspend a kid from school if
his parents do not medicate him for his hyperactivity, can
probably insist on genetic enhancement that enables children to learn better (and more economically).
Green and Harris rely on the principle of respect for
procreative autonomy to protect us from state coercion, but I
wonder how well that principle will (or should) hold up if
some forms of genetic enhancement become commonplace.
We have seen pregnant women (always poor and usually
minority) arrested and forced to give birth in shackles

faced with these new possibilities. Without a religious foundation, this comes pretty close to intuitionism.
It is precisely this “unease” and attachment to the
“given” that Ronald Green challenges. One of Green’s
themes is to warn us of the power of “status quo bias,” a
psychological phenomenon that moves people to cling to the
familiar even when the new would (objectively) be preferable. Green believes that much of the opposition to “directed
evolution” stems from “the belief that the human genome in
its present form represents the highest expression of human
biological possibility” (12). To combat such biased thinking,
Green urges us to apply the “reversal test.” For example, if
we are unnerved at the thought of an anti-aging program that
would increase the human lifespan by 30 percent, we should
ask ourselves if we would be willing to go back to a time
when our lifespan was 30 percent shorter than it is now. If
not, if we feel that somehow our current lifespan is the best
or the most natural, we may be experiencing status quo bias.
Although all three books are admirably accessible to the
general audience, Green’s most directly reaches out to a
popular readership, by incorporating science ﬁction into
each of his chapters. Given that science ﬁction, in ﬁlms such
as Gattaca and novels such as Brave New World, has mostly
depicted genetic engineering in a terrible light, Green delves
deep into the literature to present depictions of our genetic
future that are by turns appealing and cautionary. In Nancy
Kress’s Beggars trilogy, genetic modiﬁcation does indeed
disﬁgure the parent–child relationship, creates a cruel and
arrogant “genobility,” to use Max Mehlman’s useful neologism, and ends in human cataclysm. But in Octavia Butler’s
Xenogenesis trilogy, only radical genetic change can save the
human race, and the novels end “on a note of hope” (190).
Enhancing Evolution takes an uncompromising and
refreshingly utilitarian approach to these issues. In John
Harris’s view, we “ought” to want our children to be smarter,
healthier, and longer-lived, and we have a moral obligation
to pursue those goals unless we have a very good reason not
to. We may in the process change ourselves so much that we
are genetically something different than Homo sapiens, but
like Green, Harris is not necessarily attached to this particular moment in human genetic evolution. “It is difﬁcult . . . to
see any powerful principled reasons to remain human if we
can create creatures, or evolve into creatures, fundamentally
‘better’ than ourselves. It is salutary to remember that we
humans are the products of an evolutionary process that has
fundamentally changed ‘our’ nature” (40).
Harris uses a number of analogies and scenarios to
argue against a moral distinction between chemical and
mechanical enhancement. In his view, there would be no
difference, if one had a child in Little League, between
buying her the best possible glove, and buying her some pills
that sharpened her eye-hand coordination. He also argues

148

Religious Studies Review

•

VOLUME 35

•

NUMBER 3

•

SEPTEMBER 2009

versity pays humanities profs, is acceptable if, by attracting
high quality law profs, we raise the proﬁle and economic
health of the entire university, and therefore strengthen the
position even of those who teach philosophy and English lit).
The classic form of the difference principle assumes that
certain capacities, such as Bill Gates’s talent for computers
and entrepreneurship, cannot be changed. Rather, one
allows Gates to express his talents and amass his fortune, as
long as he contributes enough to society to make his good
fortune beneﬁcial to those at the bottom of the ladder. Today,
however, people in Rawls’s “original position,” deprived of
knowledge of our distinguishing features and situation in
life (does breast cancer run in my family? are my children
likely to be mathematically gifted?) might well decide to
improve underlying genetic abilities, rather than simply
mitigate the effects of individual difference. “[A] just society
may want to correct genetic conditions that impair people’s
social performance and provide genetic enhancements that
promote success” (153).
Green’s argument is persuasive as far as it goes, but I
fear that our experience with enhancements so far belies the
likelihood that we will actually behave like good Rawlsians.
In a recent interview discussing his book, Green mentioned
that three quarters of the students in his classes at Dartmouth had had orthodontia as children. His point was that
orthodontia, in many cases an enhancement rather than a
cure for a medical condition, is widely made use of, and not
a cause for concern. This caught my attention, for I have long
believed that orthodontia as it is currently practiced in the
United States is a good example of why we should fear
genetic enhancement. It is no surprise that three quarters of
a random sample of Dartmouth undergrads were the beneﬁciaries of orthodontia—they got into Dartmouth in the ﬁrst
place by being the beneﬁciaries of good schools, good neighborhoods, $250 an hour SAT prep, and so on. The popularity
of orthodontia rose in the United States when ﬂuoridated
water drastically cut down on childhood cavities, and thus
drastically cut down on dentists’ business. Suddenly, children needed orthodontia not just for real medical conditions
and serious cosmetic issues substantial enough to threaten
psychological damage, but also for the slightest misalignment or the heretofore engaging gap tooth. Because the line
between cure and enhancement is indeed a fuzzy one, skeptical parents found it nearly impossible to ﬁgure out whether
the orthodontia being recommended for their kids was
indeed a necessity or purely cosmetic. Just as they found it
impossible to resist the competitive advantage of expensive
SAT prep tests when all the other kids were doing it, they
found it impossible to risk allowing their children to have
less than “perfect” teeth. The bar is thus lifted, and anyone
with unperfected teeth now looks like she grew up poor and
neglected. Picking up my son at middle school in Shaker

because their illicit drug use threatened the health of their
fetuses. If, to use Green’s own example, genetic engineering
could spare children from the difﬁculties of dyslexia (also
saving the state a great deal of money spent on special
education and improving the children’s likelihood of productive employment), how can we be so sure that the state
would not (should not?) impose this on couples? To quote
Dov Fox, reprogenetic technologies that aim to enhance
“general purpose” traits in children such as heightened
intelligence, “are less like childrearing practices a liberal
government leaves to the discretion of parents than like
practices the state makes compulsory” (Fox 2007, 1).
A common and important argument against genetic
enhancement is that wealthy parents will be able to buy
height and brains and beauty for their kids, thus widening
the existing gap between the rich and the poor. (Perhaps
this is not as salient a complaint in the UK, with universal
health care, and where at least some forms of reproductive
technology are already covered by the NHS). A different but
related argument is that it is unjust to be devoting
resources to longer and better lives for citizens of First
World nations, when people in Swaziland barely make it
to their thirties. After all, we already know how to save
millions of lives and how to make other millions of lives
dramatically better. We do not need genetic engineering to
provide all children with mosquito netting or vaccinate
everyone against measles.
Harris’s responses to these issues is somewhat scattered. He points out that it is ethically and economically
“doubtful” to deny a beneﬁt to some unless and until it can
be provided for all. Further, he reminds us that beneﬁts,
such as literacy, that were once associated with only the
elite, are now virtually universal. Other goods, such as computers, that began as expensive and unwieldy and available
only to the few, are now democratized as they become
smaller and cheaper. Had we discouraged research on computers until everyone could have one, no one would now
have one. “Products and procedures need to start somewhere
if they are to get anywhere” (31).
Enhancing Evolution is such a rich book that it seems
churlish to wish that Harris had spent more time on the
problems of inequality. And yet, he tells us that “The moral
question is and remains: how beneﬁcial will be the proposed
enhancements and whether or not the risks of achieving
them are worth running for individuals or societies?” (54).
Surely the risk of exacerbating our already dramatic
inequalities is one that society needs to take very seriously.
Green’s response to the social justice issue begins with
the theories of John Rawls. Rawls’s famous “difference principle” says that inequality is acceptable if the difference
beneﬁts even those who are least well off. (For example, one
might argue that paying law professors twice what my uni-
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between expensive tennis lessons and chemical enhancement. But Sandel believes that this similarity “does not
vindicate genetic enhancement,” but rather “highlights a
problem with the trend toward hyperparenting,” citing
everything from sports crazed parents to the $2.5 million
test prep industry.
In the end, I suspect that readers’ own outlooks on the
future will inﬂuence their responses to these books as much
as the arguments themselves. The fortunate reader will have
the time to read all three, because each brings a unique
approach and a sharply different perspective.

Heights, I was always struck by the large majority of white
kids sporting mouth hardware, compared to the relatively
few black kids with braces.
Green may have an answer to my disquiet, however.
While I ﬁnd universally perfected teeth a bit boring compared to the variety one still sees in Europe, that is hardly a
moral argument. If everyone could have orthodontia, and
ignoring the hours wasted in waiting rooms, I suppose I
would have no complaint. In contrast to our present distribution of access to orthodontia, only partially covered even
for those fortunate enough to have dental insurance, we have
the example of ﬂuoridated water, available to everyone.
Green points out that some conditions, such as dyslexia, that
are difﬁcult and expensive to address today, might become
cheap and easy to eradicate with advances in genetic engineering. That would make them available to rich and poor
alike. (But then, there would always be a next thing. Once we
all have teeth that are even and perfect, the next concern will
be that they will not be white enough, or our gums pink
enough, or our lips plump enough . . . and off we go again).
Which brings us back, in a way, to Sandel. An attractive
element in The Case against Perfection is Sandel’s ability to
take his disquiet about the future and train that lens on the
present (reversing Green’s reversal test). Sandel might
concede Harris’s point that there is little ethical difference
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